Files
granthi-sync/README.md
T

125 lines
7.3 KiB
Markdown
Raw Normal View History

# granthi-sync v1
The signup → download → link-folders → cloud product spine for the Granthi
forge, tested against the BETA forge (granthi-beta.shre.ai). Python 3 stdlib +
git CLI only — same portability heritage as the estate's `gitea_sync.py` mesh.
```
┌──────────────┐ device flow ┌─────────────────┐
│ granthi-sync │ ───────────────▶ │ shre-id Zitadel │
│ (client, │ ◀─────────────── │ id.shre.ai │
│ Mac/laptop) │ access token └─────────────────┘
│ │
│ │ POST /v1/link {zitadel_access_token, device_name}
│ │ ───────────────▶ ┌───────────────────────────────┐
│ │ ◀─────────────── │ granthi-link :3042 │
│ │ {login, token} │ (granthi VPS, tailnet-only) │
│ │ │ · userinfo validation │
│ │ POST /v1/repos │ · ensure Gitea user (admin) │
│ │ ───────────────▶ │ · mint scoped user token │
│ │ └──────────────┬────────────────┘
│ │ git push/fetch (user token │ admin API
│ │ via credential helper) ▼
│ │ ───────────────▶ ┌───────────────────────────────┐
└──────────────┘ │ BETA forge :3041 │
│ granthi-beta.shre.ai │
└───────────────────────────────┘
```
## Components
### `server/granthi_link.py` — provisioning service (granthi VPS)
* `GET /health`
* `POST /v1/link {zitadel_access_token, device_name}` → validates the token
against `https://id.shre.ai/oidc/v1/userinfo`, derives a login from
`preferred_username` (email local-part fallback), ensures the Gitea user
exists, mints a token scoped `write:repository,write:user`, returns
`{gitea_base, login, token, token_name}`.
* `POST /v1/repos {token, name, private}` → creates the user repo with the
USER token; clone/html URLs are rebased onto `public_gitea_base` because the
container `ROOT_URL` (https://granthi-beta.shre.ai) does not resolve for
tailnet-only clients.
Deployment: `/opt/granthi-link/{granthi_link.py,config.json}` + systemd unit
`granthi-link.service`; binds `127.0.0.1:3042` **and** `100.111.127.127:3042`
(tailnet). **Not publicly exposed** — see promotion window.
Empirically verified mechanics on Gitea **1.27.1** (beta forge):
* Token minting: `POST /api/v1/users/{login}/tokens` returns **401 for
token-authenticated sudo** (both `Sudo:` header and `?sudo=`); it only works
with **admin basic auth + `Sudo: <login>` header** (201). The config
therefore carries `admin_login`/`admin_password` (root-only, 0600) in
addition to `admin_token` (minted via
`gitea admin user generate-access-token`, used for all other admin calls).
* User creation: `source_id` is omitted → **local user** with a random
30-char password, `must_change_password=false`, `visibility=private`.
Rationale: `/api/v1/admin/identity-auth-sources` 404s on 1.27.1; the
shre-id OAuth2 source is ID 1 (via `gitea admin auth list`), but users
attached to an OAuth2 source cannot basic-auth and admin-created users get
no `external_login_user` row anyway — first OIDC web login links by email
regardless of this choice.
* `test_mode` (config flag, **never in production**): allows `/v1/link` to
accept `test_userinfo` in the body instead of a Zitadel round-trip, so E2E
can exercise the ensure-user + mint path headlessly.
### `client/granthi_sync_client.py` (+ `bin/granthi-sync`) — client daemon
* `link [--server URL] [--token TOK]` — Zitadel **device flow** (native app
`granthi-sync-device`, client_id `386909715541590022`, project
granthi-forge `386906525790109702`; grants: device_code + refresh_token):
prints the verification URL + user code, polls the token endpoint
(`authorization_pending`/`slow_down` handled), then calls `/v1/link`.
`--token` skips the device flow with a ready Zitadel token (headless/dev).
Result stored in `~/.granthi-sync/config.json` (0600).
* `add <folder> [--name N] [--private|--public]``git init -b main` if
needed, creates the cloud repo via `/v1/repos`, adds remote `granthi`,
initial commit + push. The token is delivered by a **git credential
helper** (the client's hidden `git-credential` subcommand reading the 0600
config) — never embedded in the remote URL (estate rule).
* `watch [--interval 30] [--once]` — per folder: autocommit
(`sync: <ISO ts>`) → fetch → ff-pull if remote strictly ahead → push if
local strictly ahead. **DIVERGED → log + record + SKIP. Never force, never
merge** — the same policy as the mesh. SIGTERM-clean.
* `status` — table of linked folders, last sync, divergence flags.
* Run as a daemon on macOS with `client/launchd/ai.granthi.sync.plist`
(edit the script path, then `launchctl bootstrap gui/$UID <plist>`).
## Tests
* `python3 -m unittest discover -s tests` — 24 tests: autocommit/ff/diverged
logic against real temp git repos (including "diverged never touches the
remote"), config 0600 handling, mocked device-flow polling, credential
helper protocol, and the full `/v1/link` + `/v1/repos` service flows
against an in-process stub playing Zitadel + Gitea.
* Live E2E against the beta forge is recorded in the delivery notes
(link → add → watch ff/push → forced divergence → DIVERGED skip verified
via API, remote sha untouched).
## Invite-only story (v1)
There is no open signup. An operator invites a user by creating them in
shre-id (Zitadel org). The user downloads the client, runs
`granthi-sync link`, signs in at id.shre.ai with the printed device code, and
the provisioning service creates their forge account + scoped token on the
fly — the forge never sees a password and the user never sees the forge admin.
Every linked folder becomes a private repo under their account.
## Promotion window (beta → prod)
1. **Expose :3042** behind cloudflared (granthi.shre.ai vhost or
link.granthi.shre.ai) — today it is tailnet-only by design.
2. **Swap forge base URLs** in `/opt/granthi-link/config.json`:
`gitea_base` → prod forge, `public_gitea_base`
`https://granthi.shre.ai`; the client default server URL moves to the
public endpoint.
3. The `granthi-web` OIDC app already lists the prod callback; the device
app is host-independent. Rotate the beta admin token/password out of the
config when pointing at prod (prod forge is READ-ONLY to this estate —
promotion is an operator action, not an agent action).
4. Add rate limiting / abuse controls before public exposure (one token mint
per link call today).
2026-08-19 09:14:30 -04:00
<!-- review-service live check 20260819T131430Z -->