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fix(link): 3 more codex [P2] findings — per-route caps, bool rules, proxy validation

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Round 2 of review on the same branch:

- The fail-closed capacity guard was itself a DoS lever. MAX_RATE_KEYS was
  global, and the limiter runs before auth, so a flood of cheap /v1/repos
  keys could exhaust the table and 429 never-seen /v1/link clients until
  live windows expired. Budgets are now per route.
- Rule values accepted booleans: bool subclasses int, so isinstance let
  [5, true] through as a 1-SECOND window (5/hour -> ~5/sec) and false in the
  limit slot disabled the endpoint. Now `type(x) is int`.
- trusted_proxies was unvalidated: a bare string would be iterated character
  by character, malformed entries only surfaced as a per-request log line,
  and 0.0.0.0/0 or ::/0 restored "trust XFF from any peer" — the exact hole
  the setting closes. Now parsed and validated once at startup, wildcards
  refused, and _ip_in_any takes pre-parsed networks so nothing can degrade
  to a silent per-request skip.

Tests 99 -> 108: cross-route flood isolation, per-route reclamation windows,
every bool-in-rule position, bare-string and wildcard proxies, and a v4/v6
mismatch case.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LTARYHX7GPepi3CH3tp5pg
This commit is contained in:
Nirav Patel
2026-08-22 23:29:07 -04:00
co-authored by Claude Opus 5
parent c442721aff
commit c742ca4798
3 changed files with 178 additions and 41 deletions
Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files
README.md
+14 -5
View File
@@ -119,11 +119,16 @@ header, decided *before* the body is read so an abusive caller costs nothing.
multi-process or multi-host, the limiter must move with it.** The clock is
read *inside* the lock; taken outside, racing threads append out of order
and both `Retry-After` and window reclamation silently go wrong.
* The key store is capped (`MAX_RATE_KEYS`). At capacity it reclaims expired
windows, and if every window is still live it **refuses the new key** —
fail closed. Evicting a live window would let an attacker who can mint many
distinct keys clear their *own* limit on demand, which is worse than
turning a request away on an invite-only endpoint.
* The key store is capped (`MAX_RATE_KEYS`) **per route**, not globally. At
capacity it reclaims expired windows, and if every window is still live it
**refuses the new key** — fail closed. Evicting a live window would let an
attacker who can mint many distinct keys clear their *own* limit on demand.
The per-route budget matters just as much: with one shared table, a flood
of cheap `/v1/repos` keys would exhaust it and lock brand-new `/v1/link`
clients out, turning the fail-closed guard into a cross-route DoS.
* Rule values must be real integers. `bool` subclasses `int` in Python, so
`[5, true]` would otherwise pass as a **1-second** window — an hourly limit
quietly becoming ~5/sec.
* `trust_forwarded_for` is **off** by default, and turning it on **requires a
non-empty `trusted_proxies`** — the header is honored only when the socket
peer is in that list. Without it, anyone reaching the origin directly (it
@@ -133,6 +138,10 @@ header, decided *before* the body is read so an abusive caller costs nothing.
starve everyone. A caller can *prepend* anything to `X-Forwarded-For`; a
trusted proxy *appends* the peer it actually saw, so the service reads the
**last** entry, never the first, and requires it to parse as a real IP.
`trusted_proxies` is validated at startup: it must be a list (a bare string
would be iterated character by character), every entry a valid network, and
wildcards (`0.0.0.0/0`, `::/0`) are refused outright — they would restore
exactly the "trust anyone" hole the setting exists to close.
#### Identity binding (`state.json`)
server/granthi_link.py
+72 -25
View File
@@ -104,9 +104,13 @@ class RateLimiter:
def __init__(self, rules=None, max_keys=MAX_RATE_KEYS, clock=None):
self.rules = dict(rules or DEFAULT_RATE_RULES)
# Per-ROUTE budget, not one global table. A shared cap lets a flood of
# cheap /v1/repos keys exhaust the table and lock brand-new /v1/link
# clients out -- turning the fail-closed capacity guard into a
# cross-route denial of service. Each route gets its own space.
self.max_keys = max_keys
self._clock = clock or time.monotonic
self._hits = {}
self._hits = {route: {} for route in self.rules}
self._lock = threading.Lock()
def check(self, route, client):
@@ -121,43 +125,45 @@ class RateLimiter:
limit, window = rule
if limit <= 0: # 0 = endpoint disabled entirely
return False, window
key = (route, client)
with self._lock:
# Clock read INSIDE the lock: taken outside, two racing threads
# can append out of order, and both hits[0] (retry_after) and
# v[-1] (eviction age) assume the list is chronological.
# v[-1] (reclamation age) assume the list is chronological.
now = self._clock()
hits = [t for t in self._hits.get(key, ()) if now - t < window]
table = self._hits.setdefault(route, {})
hits = [t for t in table.get(client, ()) if now - t < window]
if len(hits) >= limit:
self._hits[key] = hits
table[client] = hits
return False, max(1, int(window - (now - hits[0])) + 1)
if key not in self._hits and len(self._hits) >= self.max_keys:
if client not in table and len(table) >= self.max_keys:
# At capacity, reclaim expired keys first...
self._reclaim_expired(now)
if len(self._hits) >= self.max_keys:
self._reclaim_expired(route, now)
if len(table) >= self.max_keys:
# ...and if every window is still live, this is an
# identity flood, not organic load. Evicting here would
# let an attacker reset their own limit on demand, so
# refuse the NEW key instead. Fail closed: /v1/link is
# invite-only and low-volume, so hitting this cap is an
# attack, and turning tokens away beats minting them.
LOG.error("rate limiter at capacity (%d keys) with no "
"expired windows: refusing new client %r on %s",
self.max_keys, client, route)
LOG.error("rate limiter at capacity for %s (%d keys) with "
"no expired windows: refusing new client %r",
route, self.max_keys, client)
return False, window
hits.append(now)
self._hits[key] = hits
table[client] = hits
return True, 0
def _reclaim_expired(self, now):
def _reclaim_expired(self, route, now):
"""Caller holds the lock. Drop only keys whose window has fully
expired -- never a live one, or eviction becomes the bypass."""
dead = [k for k, v in self._hits.items()
if not v or now - v[-1] >= self.rules[k[0]][1]]
for k in dead:
del self._hits[k]
expired -- never a live one, or reclamation becomes the bypass."""
window = self.rules[route][1]
table = self._hits.get(route, {})
dead = [c for c, v in table.items() if not v or now - v[-1] >= window]
for c in dead:
del table[c]
if dead:
LOG.info("rate limiter reclaimed %d expired windows", len(dead))
LOG.info("rate limiter reclaimed %d expired windows on %s",
len(dead), route)
def client_ip(handler, trust_forwarded_for, trusted_proxies=()):
@@ -202,11 +208,10 @@ def _ip_in_any(addr, networks):
except ValueError:
return False
for net in networks:
try:
if ip in ipaddress.ip_network(net, strict=False):
# Pre-parsed at startup by LinkService._parse_trusted_proxies, so a
# malformed entry can never reach here as a silent per-request skip.
if ip.version == net.version and ip in net:
return True
except ValueError:
LOG.error("ignoring malformed trusted_proxies entry %r", net)
return False
@@ -350,7 +355,8 @@ class LinkService:
f"config rate_limit.{flag} must be true or false, "
f"got {rl[flag]!r}")
self.trust_forwarded_for = rl.get("trust_forwarded_for", False)
self.trusted_proxies = tuple(rl.get("trusted_proxies") or ())
self.trusted_proxies = self._parse_trusted_proxies(
rl.get("trusted_proxies"))
if self.trust_forwarded_for and not self.trusted_proxies:
raise SystemExit(
"config rate_limit.trust_forwarded_for requires a non-empty "
@@ -359,8 +365,12 @@ class LinkService:
if rl.get("enabled", True):
rules = dict(DEFAULT_RATE_RULES)
for route, spec in (rl.get("rules") or {}).items():
# `type(x) is int`, NOT isinstance: bool subclasses int, so
# isinstance lets [5, true] through as a 1-SECOND window --
# an hourly limit silently becomes ~5/sec -- and false in the
# limit slot disables the endpoint.
if (not isinstance(spec, (list, tuple)) or len(spec) != 2
or not all(isinstance(x, int) for x in spec)
or not all(type(x) is int for x in spec)
or spec[1] <= 0):
# A malformed rule must not silently mean "unlimited".
raise SystemExit(
@@ -377,6 +387,43 @@ class LinkService:
LOG.warning("rate limiting DISABLED by config -- /v1/link will "
"mint tokens without any throttle")
@staticmethod
def _parse_trusted_proxies(raw):
"""Validate at STARTUP, not per request.
This setting gates a spoofable identity, so every failure mode has to
be loud and early: a bare string would be iterated character by
character (each char a "network"), malformed entries would only
surface as a per-request log line, and a wildcard like 0.0.0.0/0 or
::/0 quietly restores "trust X-Forwarded-For from anyone" -- the exact
hole trusted_proxies exists to close.
"""
if raw is None:
return ()
if isinstance(raw, str) or not isinstance(raw, (list, tuple)):
raise SystemExit(
"config rate_limit.trusted_proxies must be a list of CIDRs, "
f"got {type(raw).__name__}")
nets = []
for entry in raw:
if not isinstance(entry, str):
raise SystemExit(
f"config rate_limit.trusted_proxies entry {entry!r} "
"must be a string")
try:
net = ipaddress.ip_network(entry, strict=False)
except ValueError as e:
raise SystemExit(
f"config rate_limit.trusted_proxies entry {entry!r} "
f"is not a valid network: {e}")
if net.prefixlen == 0:
raise SystemExit(
f"config rate_limit.trusted_proxies entry {entry!r} "
"matches every address, which is the same as trusting "
"X-Forwarded-For from any peer -- refusing")
nets.append(net)
return tuple(nets)
def test_mode_enabled(self):
"""Config test_mode is honored ONLY with the env gate also set."""
if not self.cfg.get("test_mode"):
tests/test_server.py
+91 -10
View File
@@ -544,7 +544,7 @@ class TestRateLimiterUnit(unittest.TestCase):
for i in range(500):
self.now += 0.001
rl.check("/v1/link", f"10.0.{i // 256}.{i % 256}")
self.assertLessEqual(len(rl._hits), 50 + 1)
self.assertLessEqual(len(rl._hits["/v1/link"]), 50 + 1)
def test_expired_keys_are_reclaimed(self):
rl = granthi_link.RateLimiter(rules={"/v1/link": (5, 60)},
@@ -554,7 +554,7 @@ class TestRateLimiterUnit(unittest.TestCase):
self.now += 120 # everything expires
for i in range(10, 25):
rl.check("/v1/link", f"10.0.0.{i}")
self.assertLessEqual(len(rl._hits), 11)
self.assertLessEqual(len(rl._hits["/v1/link"]), 11)
def test_concurrent_checks_never_exceed_the_limit(self):
"""The lock has to actually hold under threads: 40 racing callers
@@ -585,7 +585,9 @@ class _FakeHandler:
class TestClientIp(unittest.TestCase):
PROXY = ("10.0.0.0/8",)
# Pre-parsed, exactly as LinkService._parse_trusted_proxies hands them
# over -- validation happens once at startup, never per request.
PROXY = granthi_link.LinkService._parse_trusted_proxies(["10.0.0.0/8"])
def test_socket_peer_by_default(self):
h = _FakeHandler("5.5.5.5", xff="1.2.3.4")
@@ -618,10 +620,16 @@ class TestClientIp(unittest.TestCase):
self.assertEqual(granthi_link.client_ip(h, True, self.PROXY),
"10.0.0.1")
def test_malformed_trusted_proxy_entry_does_not_grant_trust(self):
def test_malformed_trusted_proxy_entry_is_rejected_at_startup(self):
"""It never reaches a request: a bad CIDR kills the process rather
than degrading to a per-request log line."""
with self.assertRaises(SystemExit):
granthi_link.LinkService._parse_trusted_proxies(["not-a-cidr"])
def test_v4_peer_does_not_match_a_v6_trusted_net(self):
nets = granthi_link.LinkService._parse_trusted_proxies(["fd00::/8"])
h = _FakeHandler("10.0.0.1", xff="9.9.9.9")
self.assertEqual(
granthi_link.client_ip(h, True, ("not-a-cidr",)), "10.0.0.1")
self.assertEqual(granthi_link.client_ip(h, True, nets), "10.0.0.1")
class TestRateLimitConfig(ServiceTestBase):
@@ -693,14 +701,14 @@ class TestRateLimitHardening(unittest.TestCase):
max_keys=5, clock=lambda: now[0])
for i in range(5):
self.assertTrue(rl.check("/v1/link", f"10.0.0.{i}")[0])
victim_hits = list(rl._hits[("/v1/link", "10.0.0.0")])
victim_hits = list(rl._hits["/v1/link"]["10.0.0.0"])
for i in range(100, 140): # identity flood
allowed, retry = rl.check("/v1/link", f"10.0.1.{i}")
self.assertFalse(allowed)
self.assertGreater(retry, 0)
# the earlier client's window survived the flood untouched
self.assertEqual(rl._hits[("/v1/link", "10.0.0.0")], victim_hits)
self.assertLessEqual(len(rl._hits), 5)
self.assertEqual(rl._hits["/v1/link"]["10.0.0.0"], victim_hits)
self.assertLessEqual(len(rl._hits["/v1/link"]), 5)
def test_capacity_recovers_once_windows_expire(self):
now = [1000.0]
@@ -723,7 +731,7 @@ class TestRateLimitHardening(unittest.TestCase):
t.start()
for t in ts:
t.join()
hits = rl._hits[("/v1/link", "7.7.7.7")]
hits = rl._hits["/v1/link"]["7.7.7.7"]
self.assertEqual(len(hits), 200)
self.assertEqual(hits, sorted(hits), "timestamps out of order")
@@ -770,3 +778,76 @@ class TestRateLimitConfigTypes(ServiceTestBase):
"trusted_proxies": ["10.0.0.0/8", "127.0.0.1/32"]})
self.assertTrue(svc.trust_forwarded_for)
self.assertEqual(len(svc.trusted_proxies), 2)
class TestRateLimitRound2(unittest.TestCase):
"""The three findings from the codex re-review."""
def test_flooding_one_route_cannot_lock_out_another(self):
"""A shared key table turned the fail-closed capacity guard into a
cross-route DoS: cheap /v1/repos keys could exhaust it and shut new
/v1/link clients out. Budgets are per route."""
now = [1000.0]
rl = granthi_link.RateLimiter(
rules={"/v1/link": (5, 3600), "/v1/repos": (60, 3600)},
max_keys=20, clock=lambda: now[0])
for i in range(300): # flood the cheap route
rl.check("/v1/repos", f"10.1.{i // 256}.{i % 256}")
allowed, _ = rl.check("/v1/link", "203.0.113.7") # never-seen client
self.assertTrue(allowed, "/v1/link locked out by a /v1/repos flood")
def test_reclaim_uses_the_right_window_per_route(self):
now = [1000.0]
rl = granthi_link.RateLimiter(
rules={"/v1/link": (1, 3600), "/v1/repos": (1, 10)},
max_keys=2, clock=lambda: now[0])
rl.check("/v1/repos", "a")
rl.check("/v1/repos", "b")
self.assertFalse(rl.check("/v1/repos", "c")[0])
now[0] += 11 # past the /v1/repos window only
self.assertTrue(rl.check("/v1/repos", "c")[0])
class TestRateLimitConfigRound2(ServiceTestBase):
def _svc(self, rl):
cfg = dict(self.svc.cfg)
cfg["rate_limit"] = rl
return granthi_link.LinkService(cfg)
def test_booleans_are_rejected_in_rule_slots(self):
"""bool subclasses int, so isinstance let [5, True] through as a
1-SECOND window -- 5/hour silently became ~5/sec."""
for bad in ([5, True], [True, 3600], [False, 3600], [5, False]):
with self.subTest(rule=bad):
with self.assertRaises(SystemExit):
self._svc({"rules": {"/v1/link": bad}})
def test_valid_int_rule_still_accepted(self):
svc = self._svc({"rules": {"/v1/link": [5, 3600]}})
self.assertEqual(svc.limiter.rules["/v1/link"], (5, 3600))
def test_trusted_proxies_as_bare_string_refuses_startup(self):
"""A string would be iterated character by character, each char
treated as a network."""
with self.assertRaises(SystemExit):
self._svc({"trust_forwarded_for": True,
"trusted_proxies": "10.0.0.0/8"})
def test_wildcard_trusted_proxy_refuses_startup(self):
"""0.0.0.0/0 or ::/0 restores 'trust XFF from anyone' -- the exact
hole trusted_proxies exists to close."""
for wild in ("0.0.0.0/0", "::/0"):
with self.subTest(cidr=wild):
with self.assertRaises(SystemExit):
self._svc({"trust_forwarded_for": True,
"trusted_proxies": [wild]})
def test_non_string_proxy_entry_refuses_startup(self):
with self.assertRaises(SystemExit):
self._svc({"trust_forwarded_for": True,
"trusted_proxies": [10, "10.0.0.0/8"]})
def test_host_address_without_prefix_is_accepted(self):
svc = self._svc({"trust_forwarded_for": True,
"trusted_proxies": ["127.0.0.1", "10.0.0.0/8"]})
self.assertEqual(len(svc.trusted_proxies), 2)