Last unbuilt item on the promotion-window hardening checklist. /v1/link
round-trips Zitadel, can CREATE a forge account and always mints a token, so
it is the endpoint that must not be free to hammer.
Sliding window per (route, client), ON by default -- unlimited has to be a
deliberate config act, not an omission. Defaults 5/hour and 60/hour; /health
never limited. 429 + Retry-After, decided BEFORE the body is read so an
abusive caller costs nothing.
Decisions worth naming:
- State is an in-process dict behind a lock. granthi-link is ONE
ThreadingHTTPServer, so that IS the store -- no redis. Kept behind a class
so a future multi-process move has one thing to change.
- Denied requests are NOT recorded. Recording them lets a hammering client
push its own window forward and lock itself out forever.
- Key store is capped; at capacity it drops least-recent windows and logs
loudly. Fail-open under key pressure, chosen over an unbounded dict that
is a memory DoS.
- trust_forwarded_for OFF by default. Behind cloudflared every request comes
from the tunnel, so limiting on the socket peer starves everyone; but XFF
is client-controlled. A caller can PREPEND, a trusted proxy APPENDS what it
actually saw -- so we read the LAST entry, never the first.
- A malformed rule refuses startup instead of silently meaning unlimited.
Tests 69 -> 87, including a 40-thread race proving the lock holds, the
self-lockout case, XFF spoof-resistance, and a real 429 on the wire.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LTARYHX7GPepi3CH3tp5pg
