A provider 2xx means it accepted the message, not that anyone received
it. Twilio answers 201 Created and the carrier may refuse seconds later,
and nothing watching HTTP status codes will ever know.
That is not hypothetical: the ledger shows 48 consecutive messages to
one number, every one undelivered, going back to January - including a
daily send for seven weeks. Each was recorded upstream as a success, and
each was billed.
Two decisions worth keeping. We poll rather than take a StatusCallback,
because this relay binds to loopback on purpose and no carrier can reach
it - polling costs one API call per run and keeps that property. And we
reconcile against the provider's ledger rather than our own record,
because our own record is exactly what was wrong, and it only knows
about messages we sent; Twilio's knows about the ones another service
sent too, which is how those 48 would have been caught.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
The compose file published a second host port on the docker bridge IP so
sibling containers could reach the relay. That is a host-reachable address for
a service whose entire safety story is that it has exactly one, on loopback.
It joins the consumers' existing docker network instead, and is reached there
by name on the container port. Nothing about a consumer's deployment has to
change to use it, and the relay gains no address outside that network.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Services that need to reach a person hand the message here instead of each
carrying a SendGrid key. Email goes to SendGrid, SMS to Twilio; whatsapp and
push answer 501 rather than pretending.
It binds loopback and the docker bridge only. An authenticated relay on the
public internet is an open spam relay the moment the token leaks, and that
token is copied into every consumer's environment.
The log names a channel, a redacted address and the provider's answer. Never
the subject, never the body.